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Potential Impacts of Pharmaceutical Uses of Transgenic Tobacco: The Case of Human 
Serum Albumin (HSA) 
Abstract  
The potential size and distribution of benefits from transgenic tobacco as a source of human 
serum albumin are estimated using an economic surplus model with imperfect competition. The 
results demonstrate that new products from bio-pharming applications stand to generate 
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Potential Impacts of Pharmaceutical Uses of Transgenic Tobacco: The Case of Human 
Serum Albumin (HSA) 
 
Transgenic plants and animals have received considerable attention over the last decade as 
potential production sources for pharmaceutical drugs. Hiatt et al. (1989) were the first to 
produce antibodies in plants; subsequent experiments demonstrated that transgenic plants and 
animals can synthesize (at the laboratory scale) many of the proteins that are used by the 
pharmaceutical industry to produce drugs
1. With laboratory success, the focus has more recently 
shifted to safety/efficacy studies (with some proteins currently being tested in human clinical 
trials), and to developing industrial scale production methods. Although no protein derived from 
transgenic plants or animals is presently on the market, there are indications that drugs derived 
from transgenic systems will be available to consumers in the foreseeable future.  
Molecular farming (or bio-pharming) is a term used to describe the use of genetically 
modified plants or animals as production systems for therapeutic proteins. One of the benefits 
that molecular farming offers is the potential cost advantage, compared to current drug 
production methods. In fact, some empirical studies have shown that transgenic plants can 
produce recombinant proteins (proteins produced in the cells of genetically modified organisms) 
10-100 times cheaper than cell culture systems
2 (Misson and Curling, 2000: Kusnadi et al., 
1997). Moreover, molecular farming with transgenic plants may hold certain advantages over 
protein production using transgenic animals: plants have a greater ability to produce complex 
                                                 
1 The term drug here indicates the final product sold in the market, whereas protein refers to the material from which 
the drug is made. 
2 Cell culture systems refer to bacterial or mammalian cells genetically modified to express a desired protein. 
Examples are Chinese Hamster Ovary and Escherchica Coli.   3
proteins, and they do not serve as hosts for mammalian pathogens (reducing the risk of 
contamination) (Cramer et al, 1996). Across the range of potential transgenic plants, some have 
suggested that tobacco represents an ideal vehicle for molecular farming because it is not used in 
the feed or food chain, and it is not highly regulated by food laws.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential size and distribution of benefits from 
molecular farming with (patented) transgenic tobacco.  The study examines the case of 
producing human serum albumin (HSA) out of transgenic tobacco, a protein with widespread 
use. An economic surplus model is employed that allows for market power associated with the 
developer holding patent rights. The first section of the paper introduces HSA, its uses, current 
production methods and market characteristics along with a short description of the HSA 
production method using transgenic tobacco. The model, including the effects of the patent 
holder’s market power, is then presented in the second section. Data sources and modeling 
results are given in the third section. The last section summarizes the findings and discusses the 
implications for fostering the emergence of the bio-pharming industry. 
 
HSA Production and Market Characteristics 
HSA is primarily used for blood volume replacement in medical situations involving 
severe burns, surgeries, and shock, and is more effective in these scenarios than cheaper, more 
available (crystalloid and non-plasma colloid) substitutes. It is also used as a stabilizer in 
pharmaceutical products and as a coating for medical devices. HSA is the most abundant protein 
in blood plasma
3, with one liter of plasma containing about 60 percent HSA (approximately 25 
grams HSA/liter plasma). 
                                                 
3 Plasma is the portion of blood that remains after red and white cells are removed.   4
Although blood plasma represents the richest source of HSA, there are problems 
associated with the purity of HSA obtained from human donor blood, currently the most 
available source of blood plasma. Donated blood plasma can carry viruses like Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), Hepatitis A Virus (HAV), and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD).  Such viruses must be removed during the process of HSA 
recovery from donated plasma and, although historically HSA has been a safe product, it is 
constantly subject to potential risks of contamination. 
Recovering HSA from blood plasma requires a series of steps.  The most important steps 
in achieving purity are taken during a process known as Cohn fractionation, which provides 
semi-purified fractions of plasma that contain HSA (Lin et al, 2000). HSA is not the only protein 
recovered during the fractionation process; a variety of other therapeutic proteins such as 
polyvalent intravenous immune globulin (IVIG), Factor IX, Factor XIII, IVIG, Hepatitis B IgG, 
Rabies IgG, and Thrombin are obtained as well.  
Companies that carry out plasma fractionation process millions of liters of plasma per 
year and provide several plasma-derived therapeutic proteins to the market. Until the early 1990s 
HSA was the driver of the fractionation industry (with US companies providing nearly 40 
percent of the world supply). Since then, IVIG demand has been dictating the fractionation 
process and capacity (Colgan et al., 2000). In 2002, the world market value of IVIG was more 
than $2 billion, while the market value of HSA was slightly more than $1.5 billion. 
Equivalent blood plasma products using DNA technologies, with recombinant therapeutic 
proteins, offer several potential advantages over human donor plasma. Most notably, because 
they are expressed in bacteria or animal cells, recombinant proteins are (theoretically) 100 
percent risk-free from the viral contaminants that human plasma derived products may contain.   5
But under current technologies production costs are higher ( as recombinant proteins are now 
produced using cell cultures grown in large tanks called bioreactors that are very expensive to 
built and operate).Currently, some therapeutic recombinant proteins have made it into the market 
and are competing with their plasma-derived counterparts as safety attributes appear to 
compensate for higher production costs. For example, Factor VIII and Factor IX are proteins 
derived from blood plasma that are used to treat hemophilia.  Recombinant forms of these 
proteins became widely available in the early 1990’s (O’Mahony, 1999), and since then their 
market share has been increasing considerably.  
Beyond purity/safety issues, consistence of supply is also an important issue in HSA 
production. The fractionation industry has not always been capable of providing an adequate 
HSA supply and shortages have been encountered, particularly when there are shortages of 
donated human blood plasma.  To address this issue, pharmaceutical companies have developed 
some recombinant versions of HSA. Recombumin
R is a recombinant albumin produced and 
patented by Aventis (a US pharmaceutical company), which completed large pivotal phase I 
clinical trials of the protein successfully in 2002. Recombumin
R will be used as a stabilizing 
agent for pharmaceutical and biologic products (Chuang et al. 2002). Aventis has not, however, 
pursued a recombinant version of the blood replacement form of HSA, because the product is in 
its infancy, and the FDA approval process is long and requires a significant financial 
commitment.  
 
GM HSA from Transgenic Tobacco 
Shortcomings in therapeutic protein production from blood plasma have inspired the 
production of recombinant proteins.  For recombinant HSA production, molecular farming using   6
transgenic tobacco appears to hold great promise. In particular, cost savings associated with the 
purification process from tobacco are a strong incentive for pursuing GM HSA
4 technologies. 
Moreover, GM HSA should be free from viral contaminants, and, adjusting the acreages of 
tobacco planted can control for fluctuations in HSA supply. 
The processes that tobacco biomass have to go through in order to achieve purified HSA 
for commercial purposes are quite different from those used to process HSA from blood plasma. 
Transgenic tobacco is grown in fields and collected as fresh plant material. To extract the protein 
from the fresh biomass, transgenic tobacco is ground, and then filtered and centrifuged. (see 
Millan et al., 2003 and Staub et al. 2000 for a review of the steps involved in obtaining the final 
product). 
Production costs of GM HSA are influenced by two primary factors: protein expression 
level, and purification yield
5. Plant cells can be modified to express a foreign protein in various 
cell structures such as the nucleus, intracellular fluid, oil bodies, or chloroplasts. HSA has been 
expressed in both the nuclei and chloroplast of transgenic tobacco, although research has shown 
that chloroplast expression can produce higher expression levels, eases purification, and 
increases yield, compared to other expression systems (Millan et al. 2003; Staub et. al., 2000).  
The expression level of GM HSA using chloroplasts can produce 3-4g per kg of fresh tobacco. 
Purification yield in laboratory levels is about 25 percent of the initial quantity in leaves. 
Improvement in both expression level and purification yield have a direct impact on GM HSA 
                                                 
4 GM (genetically modified) HSA in the remaining text refers to HSA from transgenic tobacco. 
5 Expression level is the amount of the targeted protein produced in tobacco leaves. Purification yield is the amount 
of the targeted protein in its pure form that is recovered at the end of the extraction process.    7
production costs. The present study assumes that chloroplast expression will be used for 




Because GM HSA has yet to reach the market, ex-ante welfare benefits are estimated in 
the present investigation. The majority of studies evaluating the benefits and distribution of 
technologies developed for agriculture have assumed perfectly competitive markets (see Alston, 
Norton and Pardey, 1995). However in this case the developer of GM HSA is likely to hold 
significant market power through its patent rights. Such imperfect competition cases in general 
fall into two categories: innovations in agricultural inputs that affect agricultural outputs 
(Moschini and Lapan, 1997; Falk-Zepeda, Traxler and Nelson, 2000); and, innovations in 
agricultural products that serve as raw materials to other industries (Wohlgenant and Lemieux, 
1989; Alston, Sexton and Zhang, 1997; Huang and Sexton, 1996).  The models capture research 
benefits and their distribution among suppliers of the input, producers and consumers. In the case 
of GM HSA, market power can be exerted by the pharmaceutical firms in both the output (HSA) 
and input markets (transgenic tobacco). In the output market, given patent protection, 
pharmaceutical companies are likely to exhibit pricing power in pharmaceutical markets. In the 
input market, pharmaceutical firms will be able to set the price for transgenic tobacco from 
farmers. Based on current experimental results, around 10,000 acres of transgenic tobacco could 
meet the world’s demand for HSA. This acreage represents only about 2.4 percent of the total 
tobacco acreage in the US. Since the tobacco production in the US has been shrinking and the 
                                                 
6 Personal interviews with representatives from Chlorogen Inc. (a biotech company working with HSA production 
from transgenic tobacco) have indicated that their efforts are directed that way.   8
need for transgenic tobacco accounts for a very modest fraction of the total acreage, the study 
assumes that pharmaceutical companies will contract with the growers and compensate them for 
their costs of production. As a result, the patent holder is a perfect monopsonist in the input 
market.  
  Although the largest five plasma fractionators serve 70 percent of the world plasma 
product market, currently there is little evidence of a price mark-up for the existing plasma-
derived products. However, the firm that succeeds in producing GM HSA, completing 
safety/efficacy trials and obtaining FDA approval, will be the only provider in the market during 
its patent period. Therefore, the company can charge a price mark-up. The magnitude of this 
mark-up will depend on the difference between its marginal cost and the current marginal cost of 
fractionation industry. Under the assumption that the quality of GM HSA from transgenic 
tobacco will be the same as that of plasma-derived HSA, the pricing behavior of the firm can be 
characterized under two different scenarios based on the magnitude of the unit cost reduction. 
Using the terminology from Moschini and Lapan (1997), the innovation will be drastic if the 
patenting firm can charge its monopoly profit maximizing price (
mP
0 in figure 2) and non-drastic 
if it cannot charge a monopoly price but, given the presence of blood plasma products, must 






0) instead.  
Following Moschini and Lapan (1997) we assume that HSA’s current production 
function is y = f(x0, z) and it can be produced with a new production function using the new 
technology according to y = g(x1,z) where f(.,.) and g(.,.) are strictly concave production 
functions. In our case x0 represents the old input, blood plasma, and x1 represents the new input, 
transgenic tobacco. Other inputs in the production function are represented by z. It is assumed 
that the patenting firm has enough capacity (or achieve enough capacity through licensing its   9
technology to other firms) to fulfill demand for HSA in the US market. In order to assess the size 
and distribution of benefits from transgenic tobacco use as a production vehicle for HSA the 
following information is needed: linear functional forms of supply and demand for HSA; price 
and quantity data on HSA production and consumption in the US; and unit production costs of 
HSA from transgenic tobacco. Surplus benefits are estimated only for the HSA market in the US 
for a one year period. Research and development costs of GM HSA are considered sunk costs.  
Assuming linear functional forms of supply and demand, and having price, quantity, and 
elasticity information, equations of supply and demand can be easily obtained.  
Demand for HSA in quantity dependent form may be stated as 
Qd = γ – δP      (1) 
Supply of HSA in quantity dependent form may be stated as 
 Qs = α + βP    (2) 
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Under the linear demand assumption, the slope of the demand function is found by substituting 
the value of ε, 
cP
0 (initial price), and 
cQ
0 (initial quantity) in equation (3). The intercept of the 
demand function is found by substituting the slope, and initial price and quantity into equation 
(1).  




− =     (4) 
Linear functional form of supply is found following the same procedure. Supply of HSA in price 




+ =    (5)  
Several studies including Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) have examined the errors due 
to assumptions made in modeling the size and distribution of research benefits. They state that 
‘in relation to total benefits, functional forms and elasticities are relatively unimportant 
compared with the nature of the supply shift’, while in relation to the distribution of benefits, the 
results are very sensitive to elasticity assumptions (Alston, Norton and Pardey, p.208, 1995). In 
the absence of information on the specific nature of the supply shift, the suggestion is the use of 
a parallel shift (Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995).  










+ =   (6)  
Where k is the size of the unit cost reduction expressed as cost savings for each unit of GM HSA 
produced compared to a unit of HSA from blood plasma.  
For comparison a pivotal supply shift for the same unit is also employed and is represented as 









   (7) 
 
Model of Non-drastic Innovation 
 
The market for HSA in the case of a non-drastic innovation is illustrated in figure 2. 
Again, the equal quality assumption ensures that consumers’ buying behavior will not be 
influenced by price.  
The non-drastic innovation can be represented using a limit price argument. The current 
HSA market is considered to be perfectly competitive with price reflecting marginal cost of the 
industry. P(Q) is the demand curve for HSA; MR is the marginal revenue curve that the   11
patenting firm faces. MC(Q) is the current supply curve of HSA market. MC1(Q)
 is the new 
supply curve after the introduction of the innovation, with a vertical parallel shift caused by a 
unit cost reduction in HSA production and MC2(Q) is the new supply curve with a pivotal supply 
shift caused by the same unit cost reduction. Under perfect competition the price of HSA is 
cP
0 
and the quantity supplied is 
cQ
0. The firm that patents GM HSA production from transgenic 
tobacco will have lower production costs. In order to maximize its profits the patenting firm’s 
optimal behavior would be to price at 
mP
0. However, it cannot price above 
cP
0 because in that 
case it loses all the market. Thus, the innovation is non-drastic and to maximize its profits the 




1 and gain all the HSA market. At a price 
of 
mP
1 consumers’ gains are very small because 
mP
1 is very close to 
cP
0.  
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To facilitate the analysis, monopoly price 
mP











1 is infinitesimal and does not really affect 
the quantity sold. Thus, consumer surplus does not change as long as the innovation is non-
drastic. Producer surplus also remains the same when the supply shift is parallel because the area 
of triangle 
cP
0CF that represents the initial producer surplus is equal to the area of triangle LME 
that is the ‘new’ producer surplus. The change caused by the vertical parallel shift in this case is 
in the form of monopoly rents, equal to the area represented by rectangle 
cP
0CML. Comparing 
this scenario to perfect competition there is a deadweight loss equal to the area of triangle CMP 
in case of a parallel supply shift. The size of the deadweight loss depends on the elasticities of 
supply and demand. Deadweight loss is smaller the more inelastic supply and demand and 
greater the more elastic supply and demand.  
A parallel shift of the supply curve results in the following surplus changes
7: 







∆CS = 0 
∆PS = 0 







DWL = triangle CMP = 0.5 (
 cP





  With a pivotal supply shift of the same unit cost reduction, consumer surplus does not 
change and profits are the same as those of a parallel shift. However, changes in total surplus, 
change in producer surplus, and deadweight loss are different. 
∆TS = triangle CMF = 0.5 (
 cP
0 –L ) 
cQ
0 
                                                 
7 In the following formulas for surplus change calculation, point C and point K in figure 2 refer to the same point. 
Point K was introduced in the figure only for illustrative purposes of the limit price argument.    13
∆PS = triangle 
cP
0CF – triangle LMF = 0.5 (
cP
0 – F) 
cQ
0 – 0.5 (L – F) 
cQ
0   
DWL = triangle CMD = 0.5 (
 cP
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Model of drastic innovation 
  As stated above, when the innovation is drastic the firm that owns the patent of GM HSA 
can behave as a perfect monopoly. In figure 3 below, the profit-maximizing price of the 
monopoly (
mP
0) is found by setting MR = MC. For some of the expected unit cost reductions 
scenarios, 
mP
0 results to be less than the current competitive price (
cP
0) of HSA, and the 
innovation is drastic. This outcome is important because besides generating profits for the patent 
holder, the innovation generates a positive change in consumer surplus.  
























Surplus changes for a drastic innovation with a parallel shift are: 
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  For a pivotal shift of the same unit cost reduction, the profits are the same as in the case 
of a parallel shift. Other surplus changes are: 
∆TS = triangle LMF + triangle LIB + triangle HBC + rectangle HIMC 
∆TS = 0.5 (L - F) 
mQ
0 + 0.5 (
cP
0 – L) 
cQ




































∆PS = triangle LMF - triangle 
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DWL = triangle CMD = 0.5 (
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The elasticities, prices and unit cost reductions used to estimate surplus changes are now 
specified. Price elasticities of supply and demand are crucial for the surplus analysis. Information 
on the elasticity of supply for HSA is not available in the literature. Based on the complex nature 
of the fractionation industry and occasional presence of supply shortages, the supply elasticity of 
HSA is considered to be inelastic and is assumed to have a value of 0.5. On the demand side, 
consumers and hospitals seem to be sensitive to the price and availability of HSA. As mentioned,   15
hospitals often use HSA substitutes, because they are cheaper and offer a more steady supply. 
Published guidelines place albumin as an alternative choice when less expensive volume 
expanders are available (Colgan, Moody and White, 2000). A study of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) in the US Congress states that HSA market is sensitive to price changes, with 
consumers paying attention to price and source of service rather than the manufacturing source 
(OTA, 1985). Alexander, Flynn and Linkins (1994) estimated price demand elasticity for 
prescription drugs in the US to have a demand elasticity of -2.8. Ellison et al. (1997) estimated 
the own price elasticity of four generic drugs that need a doctor’s prescription for consumption. 
The drugs in their study are part of the anti-infective category and are generally prescribed when 
common antibiotics are not effective in curing certain diseases. The elasticities ranged from –
1.07 to –2.97. For the purpose of the study three demand elasticities in the elastic range will be 
taken in consideration: min. –1.07, avg. –2.02 and max. -2.97.  
Price and quantity of HSA in the US market for the period from 1994-2003 in the US are 
shown in table 1 below (Marketing Research Bureau, 2004). The price of HSA has fluctuated 
extensively during that period. Norton, Alston and Pardey (1995) suggest the average price and 
quantity of the last three years be used for this type of analysis. Since the data for 2003 are 
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Table 1. The Albumin Market in the US (1994-2000) 
Year  Grams Price 
  (000) per  gram 
1994  106,500   $    3.30 
1995  110,875   $    3.33 
1996  109,188   $    3.37 
1997  100,625   $    3.44 
1998  99,250   $    4.01 
1999  82,188   $    3.30 
2000  74,225   $    2.93 
2001  85,438   $    2.72 
2002  87,375   $    2.25 
2003 *  88,000   $    2.00 
* Estimate
Source: Marketing Research Bureau (2004) 
 
The magnitude of unit cost reduction (k) reflects the difference between the current HSA 
price and GM HSA production cost per unit and is a crucial parameter in the analysis. The value 
of the unit cost reduction in commercial scale based on experimental results from biotech 
companies is expected to be between $0.3 and $0.6 per gram. Because GM HSA is still at the 
laboratory level and the exact cost savings may still vary, the analysis includes a range of $0.1 up 
to $1.0 in order to capture a wider variety of the surpluses that may be generated.  
 
Results 
Table 2 shows estimated surplus changes under parallel and pivotal supply shifts. In the 
table, ε is the price elasticity of demand, K is the unit cost reduction as a percentage of initial 
HSA price, DTSm is the change in total surplus, DPS is the change in producer’s surplus, and 
DWL is deadweight loss due to imperfect competition 
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Table 2. Economic surplus generated from a $0.1 to $1.0 unit cost reduction. 
   Parallel Supply Shift               Pivotal Supply Shift     
            ε =1.07  ε =2.02  ε =2.97          ε =1.07  ε =2.02  ε =2.97    
k ($)  K (% of P)  Profits  DTSm  DWL  DWL DWL  DPS  Profits  DTSm DWL  DWL  DWL  DPS 
0.1  0.04      8,235      8,235          53          63               67  -      8,235      4,117       4,171        4,181         4,185      (4,117)
0.15  0.06    12,352    12,352        120        141             151  -    12,352      6,176       6,298        6,320         6,330      (6,176)
0.2  0.08    16,469    16,469        213        251             268  -    16,469      8,235       8,454        8,493         8,512      (8,235)
0.25  0.10    20,587    20,587        333        392             419  -    20,587    10,293     10,638      10,701       10,730    (10,293)
0.3  0.11    24,704    24,704        480        565             603  -    24,704    12,352     12,851      12,944       12,986    (12,352)
0.35  0.13    28,821    28,821        654        769             821  -    28,821    14,411     15,095      15,222       15,281    (14,411)
0.4  0.15    32,938    32,938        854     1,004          1,072  -    32,938    16,469     17,369      17,538       17,616    (16,469)
0.45  0.17    37,056    37,056     1,080     1,271          1,357  -    37,056    18,528     19,675      19,892       19,992    (18,528)
0.5  0.19    41,173    41,173     1,334     1,569          1,675  -    41,173    20,587     22,013      22,285       22,410    (20,587)
0.55  0.21    45,290    45,290     1,614     1,898          2,027  -    45,290    22,645     24,383      24,717       24,871    (22,645)
0.6  0.23    49,408    49,408     1,920     2,259          2,412  -    49,408    24,704     26,786      27,190       27,377    (24,704)
0.65  0.25    53,525    53,525     2,254     2,651          2,831  -    53,525    26,762     29,224      29,705       29,928    (26,762)
0.7  0.27    57,642    57,642     2,614     3,074          3,283  -    57,642    28,821     31,696      32,263       32,526    (28,821)
0.75  0.29    61,760    61,760     3,001     3,529          3,769  -    61,760    30,880     34,204      34,865       35,172    (30,880)
0.8  0.30    65,877    65,877     3,414     4,016          4,288  -    65,877    32,938     36,747      37,512       37,868    (32,938)
0.85  0.32    69,994    69,994     3,854     4,533          4,841  -    69,994    34,997     39,328      40,205       40,615    (34,997)
0.9  0.34    74,111     74,411     4,321     5,082          5,427  150    74,111    37,228     41,947      42,946       43,414    (37,056) 
0.95  0.36    78,229     79,573     4,815     5,663          6,046  672    78,229    39,891     44,605      45,736       46,266    (39,114) 
1  0.38    82,346     84,740     5,335     6,274          6,700  1,197   82,346    42,570     47,302      48,576       49,175    (41,173) 
 
-The elasticity of supply is 0.5. 
-Except for k and K, results are in thousands of dollars. 
 
The total change in surplus varies from $8 million to $82 million for a parallel shift and 
from $4 million to $43 million for a pivotal shift, for unit cost reductions ranging from $0.1 to 
$1.0. As expected, benefits increase as the size of the unit cost reduction increases and total 
benefits for a pivotal shift are roughly half of those for a parallel shift. The case of HSA results 
in no benefits to consumers for a non-drastic innovation. As a result, only the deadweight loss is 
sensitive to the choice of elasticities. To see how deadweight loss varies with different values of 
supply elasticities, three different values are introduced in the Appendix. Tables A, B and C 
indicate results for supply elasticities of 0.25, 0.75 and 1.00, respectively. As expected, 
deadweight loss increases as supply becomes more elastic. Changes in producer surplus for a   18
pivotal shift are negative because the patent holder receives part of the initial producer surplus as 
profits.  
Based on the data above, the innovation is non-drastic for unit cost reductions ranging 
from $0.1 to $1.0 when elasticity of demand is either -1.07 and -2.02 and it is drastic for unit cost 
reductions greater than or equal to $0.89 when the elasticity of demand is -2.97. This outcome is 
important for the analysis of the distribution of surplus because when the innovation is drastic 
consumers can benefit as well. For a unit cost reduction of $0.9 and a demand elasticity of -2.97 
consumer surplus increases by $150,307 for a parallel shift and $172,398 for a pivotal shift. For 
the same demand elasticity and a unit cost reduction of $0.95, consumer surplus increases by 
$671,770 for a parallel shift and $777,271 for a pivotal shift. Consumer surplus increases by 
$1,196,921 for a parallel shift and by $1,397,250 for a pivotal shift when the unit cost reduction 
is $1.0. Producer surplus also changes when the innovation is drastic for a parallel supply shift. 
These consumer and producer surplus changes for drastic innovations are included in table 2 as 
part of the total benefits. Results for drastic innovations in table 2 and tables A, B and C in the 
Appendix are shown in italics. 
 
Summary and Conclusion  
  This study estimates the benefits from the use of transgenic tobacco as a source of HSA. 
Because the novel application will be patented by a biotech or pharmaceutical firm, an imperfect 
competition model was applied to estimate the size and distribution of benefits. The results of the 
study suggest that the use of transgenic tobacco for HSA production may result in significant 
total surplus gains.    19
Patent holders are the major recipients of the benefits as long as the product is under 
patent even if the innovation is not drastic. These potential annual flows of monopolist’s benefits 
appear sufficient to spur large research initiatives. Consumers, on the other hand, benefit from a 
drastic innovation but their benefits remain very small compared to the GM HSA producers. 
Furthermore, it appears that production of GM HSA will not have a significant impact on 
tobacco farmers since the acreage involved in transgenic tobacco production is relatively small 
compared to the total tobacco acreage in the US and they are likely to be contracted with to grow 
GM tobacco at cost. 
Under most scenarios the expected unit cost reduction associated with the introduction of 
GM HSA results in a non-drastic innovation. However, a drastic innovation is within the reach of 
the current research and surprisingly may actually increase benefits to consumers. 
As little attention has been given to genetically-modified agricultural crops for 
pharmaceutical uses, further explorations are necessary to shed more light on the benefits of the 
major private sector research initiatives being conducted on bio-pharming. Other areas for 
further research related to the introduction of GM HSA may be directed towards quality shifts in 
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Appendix  
 
Table A. Economic surplus generated from a $0.1 to $1.0 unit cost reduction. 
  η=0.25                 
   Parallel Supply Shift               Pivotal Supply Shift     
            ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97          ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97    
k 
($)
K (% P)  Profits  DTSm  DWL  DWL  DWL  DPS  Profits  DTSm  DWL DWL DWL DPS 
0.1  0.04  8,235  8,235  32  35  36  -  8,235  4,117  4,149  4,152  4,154  (4,117) 
0.15  0.06  12,352  12,352  71  78  81  -  12,352  6,176  6,248  6,255  6,258  (6,176) 
0.2  0.08  16,469  16,469  127  139  144  -  16,469  8,235  8,363  8,376  8,382  (8,235) 
0.25  0.10  20,587  20,587  198  218  226  -  20,587  10,293  10,495  10,516  10,524  (10,293) 
0.3  0.11  24,704  24,704  286  313  325  -  24,704  12,352  12,644  12,674  12,686  (12,352) 
0.35  0.13  28,821  28,821  389  427  442  -  28,821  14,411  14,810  14,850  14,867  (14,411) 
0.4  0.15  32,938  32,938  508  557  578  -  32,938  16,469  16,993  17,046  17,068  (16,469) 
0.45  0.17  37,056  37,056  642  705  731  -  37,056  18,528  19,193  19,261  19,289  (18,528) 
0.5  0.19  41,173  41,173  793  871  902  -  41,173  20,587  21,411  21,496  21,530  (20,587) 
0.55  0.21  45,290  45,290  960  1,054  1,092  -  45,290  22,645  23,647  23,750  23,792  (22,645) 
0.6  0.23  49,408  49,408  1,142  1,254  1,300  -  49,408  24,704  25,901  26,025  26,076  (24,704) 
0.65  0.25  53,525  53,525  1,340  1,471  1,525  -  53,525  26,762  28,174  28,320  28,380  (26,762) 
0.7  0.27  57,642  57,642  1,555  1,707  1,769  -  57,642  28,821  30,464  30,635  30,706  (28,821) 
0.75  0.29  61,760  61,760  1,785  1,959  2,031  -  61,760  30,880  32,774  32,971  33,053  (30,880) 
0.8  0.30  65,877  65,877  2,030  2,229  2,310  -  65,877  32,938  35,102  35,329  35,423  (32,938) 
0.85  0.32  69,994  69,994  2,292  2,516  2,608  -  69,994  34,997  37,450  37,708  37,815  (34,997) 
0.9  0.34  74,111  74,283  2,570  2,821  2,924  86  74,111  37,149  39,817  40,109  40,230  (37,056) 
0.95  0.36  78,229  78,997  2,863  3,143  3,258  384  78,229  39,530  42,204  42,532  42,668  (39,114) 
1  0.38  82,346  83,710  3,173  3,483  3,610  682  82,346  41,196  44,610  44,978  45,130  (41,173) 
η - Elasticity of supply  
Table B. Economic surplus generated from a $0.1 to $1.0 unit cost reduction. 
  η=0.75               
   Parallel Supply Shift               Pivotal Supply Shift     
            ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97          ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97    
k 
($) K  (%  P)  Profits  DTSm  DWL DWL DWL DPS  Profits  DTSm  DWL DWL DWL DPS 
0.1  0.04  8,235  8,235  69  86  94  -  8,235  4,117  4,188  4,205  4,213  (4,117) 
0.15  0.06  12,352  12,352  155  193  211  -  12,352  6,176  6,335  6,375  6,394  (6,176) 
0.2  0.08  16,469  16,469  276  342  375  -  16,469  8,235  8,520  8,592  8,627  (8,235) 
0.25  0.10  20,587  20,587  431  535  586  -  20,587  10,293  10,744  10,858  10,914  (10,293) 
0.3  0.11  24,704  24,704  621  771  844  -  24,704  12,352  13,006  13,174  13,257  (12,352) 
0.35  0.13  28,821  28,821  846  1,049  1,148  -  28,821  14,411  15,309  15,542  15,658  (14,411) 
0.4  0.15  32,938  32,938  1,104  1,370  1,500  -  32,938  16,469  17,653  17,963  18,119  (16,469) 
0.45  0.17  37,056  37,056  1,398  1,734  1,898  -  37,056  18,528  20,040  20,441  20,643  (18,528) 
0.5  0.19  41,173  41,173  1,726  2,141  2,344  -  41,173  20,587  22,470  22,975  23,231  (20,587) 
0.55  0.21  45,290  45,290  2,088  2,590  2,836  -  45,290  22,645  24,945  25,570  25,887  (22,645) 
0.6  0.23  49,408  49,408  2,485  3,082  3,375  -  49,408  24,704  27,467  28,226  28,612  (24,704) 
0.65  0.25  53,525  53,525  2,916  3,618  3,961  -  53,525  26,762  30,036  30,945  31,411  (26,762) 
0.7  0.27  57,642  57,642  3,382  4,196  4,593  -  57,642  28,821  32,653  33,731  34,285  (28,821) 
0.75  0.29  61,760  61,760  3,883  4,816  5,273  -  61,760  30,880  35,321  36,586  37,239  (30,880) 
0.8  0.30  65,877  65,877  4,418  5,480  5,999  -  65,877  32,938  38,041  39,512  40,274  (32,938) 
0.85  0.32  69,994  69,994  4,987  6,186  6,773  -  69,994  34,997  40,813  42,512  43,395  (34,997) 
0.9  0.34  74,111  74,511  5,591  6,935  7,593  200  74,111  37,298  43,641  45,588  46,606  (37,056) 
0.95  0.36  78,229  80,021  6,230  7,727  8,460  896  78,229  40,209  46,524  48,744  49,909  (39,114) 
1  0.38  82,346  85,544  6,903  8,562  9,374  1,599  82,346  43,151  49,466  51,983  53,311  (41,173) 
η - Elasticity of supply    24
Table C. Economic surplus generated from a $0.1 to $1.0 unit cost reduction. 
  η=1.00               
   Parallel Supply Shift               Pivotal Supply Shift     
            ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97          ε=1.07  ε=2.02  ε=2.97    
k 
($)  K (% P)  Profits  DTSm  DWL  DWL  DWL  DPS Profits  DTSm  DWL DWL DWL DPS 
0.1  0.04  8,235  8,235  81  105  117  -  8,235  4,117  4,200  4,225  4,238  (4,117) 
0.15  0.06  12,352  12,352  182  236  264  -  12,352  6,176  6,364  6,421  6,451  (6,176) 
0.2  0.08  16,469  16,469  324  419  468  -  16,469  8,235  8,572  8,676  8,731  (8,235) 
0.25  0.10  20,587  20,587  506  654  732  -  20,587  10,293  10,825  10,992  11,081  (10,293) 
0.3  0.11  24,704  24,704  728  942  1,054  -  24,704  12,352  13,126  13,372  13,504  (12,352) 
0.35  0.13  28,821  28,821  991  1,283  1,435  -  28,821  14,411  15,475  15,819  16,004  (14,411) 
0.4  0.15  32,938  32,938  1,295  1,675  1,874  -  32,938  16,469  17,874  18,334  18,584  (16,469) 
0.45  0.17  37,056  37,056  1,639  2,120  2,372  -  37,056  18,528  20,326  20,922  21,248  (18,528) 
0.5  0.19  41,173  41,173  2,023  2,618  2,928  -  41,173  20,587  22,830  23,586  24,000  (20,587) 
0.55  0.21  45,290  45,290  2,448  3,168  3,543  -  45,290  22,645  25,390  26,328  26,845  (22,645) 
0.6  0.23  49,408  49,408  2,913  3,770  4,216  -  49,408  24,704  28,006  29,152  29,788  (24,704) 
0.65  0.25  53,525  53,525  3,419  4,424  4,948  -  53,525  26,762  30,682  32,063  32,833  (26,762) 
0.7  0.27  57,642  57,642  3,965  5,131  5,739  -  57,642  28,821  33,419  35,063  35,987  (28,821) 
0.75  0.29  61,760  61,760  4,552  5,890  6,588  -  61,760  30,880  36,219  38,158  39,254  (30,880) 
0.8  0.30  65,877  65,877  5,179  6,702  7,496  -  65,877  32,938  39,084  41,352  42,642  (32,938) 
0.85  0.32  69,994  69,994  5,847  7,566  8,462  -  69,994  34,997  42,016  44,649  46,157  (34,997) 
0.9  0.34  74,111  74,591  6,555  8,482  9,487  240  74,111  37,359  45,019  48,055  49,807  (37,056) 
0.95  0.36  78,229  80,381  7,303  9,450  10,570  1,076  78,229  40,489  48,094  51,575  53,598  (39,114) 
1  0.38  82,346  86,188  8,092  10,471  11,712  1,921  82,346  43,669  51,245  55,216  57,541  (41,173) 
η - Elasticity of supply  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 